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Abstract: 
Three models that can be used to investigate the effects of different environmental events on 
brain development and organization are explored. The insult model argues against brain 
plasticity, and the environmental model regards the brain as infinitely plastic. Our work is guided 
by the transactional model, which views brain development and organization as an interaction 
between (a) genetically coded programs for the formation and connectivity of brain structures 
and (b) environmental modifiers of these codes. Data are reported from our cognitive and 
socioemotional research studies that support the notion of plasticity during the first 2 years of 
life. From our work with normal developmental processes, we draw parallels to abnormal 
development and speculate how the transactional model can be used to explain abnormal brain 
organization and development. 
 
Article: 
The question of whether there is neural plasticity in development is one that has taken many 
forms in the research literature. The high-risk infant literature has asked the question by 
examining the developmental consequences of injury to particular areas of the brain in very low-
birthweight infants (e.g., intraventricular hemorrhage [IVH]; Sostek, Smith, Katz, & Grant, 
1987). The more general question has been asked with regard to the role of experience on brain 
development. Here, the research literature has approached the problem from two opposing 
directions. There are studies that attempt to examine the effects of deprived environments on 
brain development both directly and indirectly, and to a lesser extent, there are studies that have 
examined the effects of enriched environments on brain development. Many of the studies on the 
role of either deprived or enriched environments have utilized animal models (e.g., Greenough & 
Volkmar, 1973; Rosenzweig, Bennett, & Diamond, 1972). These studies are able to document 
specific changes in neural development that occur as a function of environmental manipulation 
(e.g., synaptic growth, dendritic arborization or lack thereof). Studies with human infants or 
children have attempted through indirect methods to assess the effects of specific environments 
on brain growth and change. For example, studies of severe malnutrition or dietary supplement 
reveal the effects of altering the environment on intellectual or social development (e.g., Pollitt, 
Gorman, Engle, Martorell, & Rivera, 1993). Researchers assume that these documented effects 
are a function of changes in brain development, although the specific neural changes are left 
unspecified. 
 
In part, the inability of researchers to specify the effects of environment on neural development 
has been a function of technology and the interpretive models that were associated with our 
knowledge about brain development. Although the recording of electrical activity off the scalp 
(the electroencephalogram [EEG]) of humans has been around since Berger first described it 65 
years ago (Berger, 1929), this measure was, for a long period, relegated to use in clinical settings 
for the diagnosis or identification of epilepsy and tumor or as a measure of state. Due mainly to 
technical limitations on the ability to record multiple channels and to digitize, acquire, and store 
these data for complex signal analysis, EEGs were not utilized as a method for describing brain 
development. In addition, there have been, and continue to be, important questions regarding the 
localization of the EEG signals and the relation between these signals and brain function (e.g., to 
what degree do EEG measures reflect cortical vs. subcortical activation?; see Bell & Fox, 1994a, 
for a discussion of these and similar issues). 
 
A number of changes have occurred over the past 20 years that enable a broader look into the 
effects of environmental manipulation on brain activity. First, computer technology has changed 
rapidly, allowing for the acquisition, storage, and manipulation of very large data sets. This has 
enabled complex analysis of signals acquired over time such as EEGs or evoked potentials. What 
was once relegated to analysis via paper strip chart can now be examined with the powerful tools 
of signal analysis to obtain new information about the signal. 
 
Second, changes in technology have seen the advancement of multiple methods for imaging 
brain structure including computer automated tomography scan and magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI). In addition, there are sophisticated means for assessing brain function with positron 
emission tomography (PET) scan and real-time MRI. A number of these methods involve the use 
of radioactive materials and all involve the need for a high degree of patient compli ance that 
have made these methods inaccessible to developmental researchers interested in studying 
infants and young children (but see Chugani & Phelps, 1986; Chugani, Phelps, & Mazziotta, 
1987). However, the use of these technologies in combination with more traditional methods of 
measurement of brain electrical activity via EEGs and evoked potentials has illuminated both the 
positive aspects of the use of the EEG for the study of brain structure and function. 
 
A third change in the utilization of measures of brain electrical activity involves the development 
of theoretical models to interpret the functional significance of certain parameters of both the 
ongoing EEG and evoked potentials. Among the more influential theorists in this area is Paul 
Nunez (1981), who has articulated a model for understanding dynamic changes in EEG activity. 
This model characterized the electrical activity recorded off the scalp in terms of its spatial 
properties. That is, EEG signals are thought of as waves propagating through cerebral space. The 
patterns of EEG activity reflect both cortico-cortical links and cortical-subcortical connections. 
While data on frequency and amplitude provide information on the excitability of neural 
networks, it is the interconnection between sites, the coherence, and phase relations in the EEG 
at a given frequency that are of most interest to Nunez (1981). 
 
Thatcher (1991; Thatcher, Krause, & Hrybyk, 1986; Thatcher, Walker, & Giudice, 1987) has 
presented empirical support for Nunez's model. Thatcher utilized measures of the coherence of 
the EEG at specific frequencies between electrode sites. These measures of coherence reflect, in 
part, the action of both long and short axonal connections. Thatcher predicted that, with 
development, coherence should decrease between sites that are topographically close. This 
decrease would reflect greater synaptic differentiation within a particular area. On the other 
hand, with development, coherence would increase between sites that are topographically distant. 
According to the Nunez model, this change would reflect increasing connectivity between 
anterior and posterior sites within and between hemispheres. 
 
In sum, until recently, studies of the effects of environmental manipulation on brain organization 
or reorganization have been completed mainly via animal studies, or these effects have been 
understood via indirect measurement of intellectual or social behavior after severe environmental 
experience. Recent advances in technology and in the modeling of complex systems have al-
lowed researchers to utilize sophisticated neuroimaging techniques as well as noninvasive 
measures that record brain electrical activity. These methods and approaches have opened the 
possibility of examining the effects of normal developmental events and extreme circumstances 
upon the course of brain development during the first years of life. 
 
Models of Brain-Behavior Development 
The manner in which studies of neural plasticity are completed is obviously a function of the 
model of development and brain-behavior relations that is utilized. Three models come to mind 
as possible means for investigating the effects of different environmental events on brain 
development and organization. The first we call the insult model, the second the environmental 
model, and the third the transactional model of brain development. 
 
The insult model 
The insult model is one that argues against the notion of neural plasticity. Brain organization and 
development are fixed, and environmental input cannot change (except via damage) this 
organization and developmental course. There are a number of different ways that this model has 
been presented for studying neural development. The most obvious instantiation of this model is 
one that states that when environmental events produce changes or damage to brain structure, 
this damage (or insult) remains static and the functions that the damaged structure subsumed 
cannot be recovered. So, for example, IVH in premature infants may damage certain brain 
structures or particular regions of cortex. The functions subsumed by these structures or regions 
are lost and cannot be recovered. 
 
Evidence against the strong "insult" position and for neural plasticity may be found in the work 
on infants who have undergone IVH. Sostek et al. (1987), for example, reported that an IVH 
insult may have limited predictive value for mental, motor, or neurologic functioning at 2 years 
of age. Such evidence might indicate that areas other than the one damaged have "taken over" the 
function lost through damage or that there has been reorganization at a systems level so that 
function is recovered via compensatory behaviors that do not precisely duplicate the original 
function. One might be able to differentiate between these two explanations by testing the 
specific competencies thought to underlie the damaged region or area. If function is present and 
cannot be discriminated from that of normal, nondamaged subjects, then it is possible that other 
areas have taken over for the damaged one. On the other hand, if there are subtle differences in 
function and performance, then one might infer that other compensatory mechanisms are 
involved in recovery. 
 
A variant on this model would be one that was, for many years, a leading model for brain 
organization and language development. Lennenberg (1967) postulated that after a certain age 
brain development was set and injury to a particular area of the brain (that which involved 
language processes) would result in lasting impairment. Prior to the critical age at which brain 
organization was complete, there was some degree of plasticity so that other regions could 
subsume the function of the region or area that was damaged. Note, then, that the insult model is 
modified by the notion of a critical period. Prior to the critical period, after which organization is 
completed, neural plasticity is possible. After the critical period, the likelihood of plasticity is 
significantly diminished. The existence of a critical period for neural organization is evidence, in 
and of itself, of neural plasticity. The assumption of this model is that, prior to a certain 
developmental age, the brain is receptive to environmental input or at least to the possibility of 
reorganization. However, it is unclear whether specific structures have taken on the functions 
lost (via damage or loss of input) or whether, via system re-organization, compensatory 
mechanisms work to allow the function to operate. 
 
A second variant of the insult model is the notion that particular individuals are born with certain 
patterns of brain structure, or differences in the excitability of certain structures, which forms the 
basis for certain unique qualities of behavior. For example, there is a great deal of discussion 
about inborn traits or temperament in infants and the "biological" basis of these patterns of 
behavior. There is evidence indicating that infants who display certain patterns of motor arousal 
and affect are likely to display behavioral inhibition as toddlers (Calkins, Fox, & Marshall, in 
press; Kagan & Snidman, 1991). And there are particular psychophysiological correlates of this 
infant temperamental pattern that suggest the involvement of particular subcortical structures. 
Specifically, Kagan and colleagues first reported that 4-month-old infants who exhibit extreme 
degrees of motor arousal and negative affect in response to novel stimuli are more likely to 
display behavioral inhibition in the 2nd year of life (Kagan & Snidman, 1991). Behaviorally 
inhibited toddlers are known to display high resting heart rates and high basal levels of cortisol 
(Kagan, Reznick, & Snidman, 1987). In our laboratory, we have found that infants who exhibit 
extreme degrees of motor arousal and negative affect in response to novelty display greater 
relative right frontal EEG activation and are likely to be fearful and inhibited as toddlers (Calkins 
et al., in press). Kagan has suggested that the pattern of motor arousal and negative affect ex-
pression is a function of greater excitability in areas of the limbic system thought to be involved 
in fear responses (Kagan & Snidman, 1991). 
 
Animal work has shown that the central nucleus of the amygdala is an important structure in the 
conditioning and expression of fear in animals (e.g., Adamec & StarkAdamec, 1986). Given the 
structural connections between amygdala and frontal cortex, it is reasonable to assume that 
greater right frontal EEG activation, recorded in behaviorally inhibited infants, may reflect 
activity in those subcortical centers involved in fear responses. These physiological patterns may 
remain stable over time and reflect the underlying basis for certain temperamental dispositions. 
 
Evidence for neural plasticity may be found if there are changes in the degree of arousal of these 
subcortical or cortical centers over the course of early development. There is evidence from 
Kagan's laboratory, for example, that a certain percentage of behaviorally inhibited infants 
become less inhibited over time due to certain types of rearing environments (Kagan, Snidman, 
& Arcus, 1993). Is it the case that these phenotypic changes are accompanied by change in the 
activation of those subcortical or cortical patterns that earlier had been associated with the 
presence of behavioral inhibition (do these children, now no longer inhibited, present with EEG 
patterns similar to temperamentally noninhibited children) or does the original EEG pattern 
persist? 
 
The first instance might be interpreted as evidence for neural plasticity because neural patterns 
associated with heightened fear are no longer present when the child ceases to display inhibited 
behavior. In the latter instance, the change in phenotypic behavior occurs as a result of activity in 
other brain regions that then serve to modulate the arousal of those centers involved in the fear 
response. However, infants with changed phenotypic behavior (those who were once inhibited 
and are no longer) continue to exhibit arousal of these fear centers, probably reflecting a lower 
threshold for the expression of negative affect similar to the pattern presented during the infancy 
period. They carry with them, according to the insult model, the original neural pattern. It is 
merely dampened by other processes. We will present data later in this paper that directly 
address this issue. 
 
The environmental model 
One possible position regarding neural plasticity is that the brain is infinitely plastic. 
Environmental input alters, at every turn, and, in some manner, neural organization. On some 
level, such a relation must exist, because neural changes occur when stimuli are sensed and when 
learning has taken place. On the other hand, the extreme position of this theory is that all regions 
or structures in the brain are somehow interchangeable, with each area having the potential to 
subsume multiple functions. This notion of equipotentiality was first articulated by Sherrington 
in the late 1800s with regard to the effects of brain injury particularly during development. 
 
For the behavioral psychologist, this model may serve as a basis toward articulating a minimal 
role for genetic neural organization in the development and expression of behavior. Although 
behavior and psychological processes have their corresponding bases in neural organization, that 
organization is subject to constant change and modification when appropriate environmental 
stimuli are presented. 
 
There are a number of reasons why this model fails to adequately describe neural plasticity. First 
and foremost, the literature on the effects of brain damage is overwhelming in finding that 
damage to certain regions of the brain affects function and that there is often little recovery of 
function (Milner, Petrides, & Smith, 1985; Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Wilkins, Shallice, & 
McCarthy, 1987). Second, there seems to be a clear genetic pattern to both the embryological 
and morphological development of brain structure that, if altered, significantly affects function 
(e.g., phenylketonuria [PKU]; (Diamond, Hurwitz, Lee, Grover, & Minarcik, 1994). 
Nevertheless, there are, in all probability, individual differences in the patterning of brain 
structure, and these differences are a function of differential environmental input. That is, within 
certain limits, it may be the case that different environments contribute to the pattern of inter-
connections or other parameters of brain structure. Exactly what those limits are and how they 
correspond to structure is the subject of much debate. 
 
The transactional model 
A third possible model for understanding the role of plasticity in neural development is the 
transactional model. This model views development and organization of brain activity as a 
process of transaction between (a) genetically coded programs for the formation of structures and 
connections among structures and (b) environmental influence. This transaction regulates the 
initiation, speed, and success (or failure) of preprogrammed genetic codes. There is constant 
feedback between environment and genes and between genes and environment. Environment 
initiates the expression of certain genes while genetic tendencies create environments that in turn 
alter future biological expression (see Scarr & McCartney, 1983). Thus, for example, the source 
of the organization of the cortex with regard to interconnections among different regions may be 
a genetic program. But the rate and success of the program is under the influence of 
environmental input. This input may initiate, accelerate, and in some instances retard changes in 
neural organization or growth. 
 
There are a number of examples from the area of behavioral neuroscience that support this 
model. For example, GoldmanRakic has reported in a series of studies, the effects of orbital 
prefrontal cortex lesions on monkeys' performance on a battery of prefrontal tasks (Goldman, 
1971, 1976; Goldman & Mendelson, 1977). After receiving lesions as infants, the monkeys were 
tested at either age 1 or 2 years and could not perform the task; however, at a subsequent testing, 
1 year later at either age 2 or age 3, the monkeys were successful. Goldman-Rakic speculated 
that experience interacted with neural development to improve performance. 
 
Goldman-Rakic (Goldman & Mendelson, 1977) also looked at the more general effects of 
experience on brain organization. She reported that training orbital lesioned rhesus infants on a 
nonspatial task improved their performance on a spatial task as juveniles. Here, early training 
and experience acted nonspecifically to offset deficits. Early experience on one task generalized 
to other nonrelated tasks. General environmental experience produced new synaptic connections 
that aided the orbital monkeys to successfully solve the spatial task. 
 
The work of Neville has important implications for examining how environmental experiences 
affect genetically programmed brain structure in humans. Neville (1988, 1990, 1991) has 
examined cortical functioning of hearing and deaf subjects by testing subjects on a task that 
requires visual sensory processing. Neville (1990) hypothesized that congenitally deaf subjects 
might utilize the area of the cortex normally used for auditory processing for other sensory 
processing. Utilizing a spatial visual attention task, Neville (1988, 1990, 1991) measured ERPs 
in hearing subjects, congenitally deaf subjects, and hearing subjects of deaf parents. The last two 
groups had learned American Sign Language from birth. 
 
Neville found that both early sensory deprivation and early language experience with sign 
language had different and specific effects on specializations of cortical areas. Specifically, for 
spatial visual attention to peripheral stimuli, hearing subjects displayed right hemisphere 
parietal/temporal activation (typical for spatial tasks) while deaf subjects and hearing subjects of 
deaf parents displayed left hemisphere parietal/ temporal activation. This finding is significant 
because left hemisphere areas are usually involved in spoken language. Using a paradigm where 
hearing and deaf subjects saw a written word and then wrote it down and saw a signed word and 
then signed it back, Neville (1991) demonstrated that deaf subjects showed no left hemispheric 
specialization for the written word; however, deaf subjects did show left hemispheric special-
ization for the signed word. Neville hypothesized that initial brain growth and cortical 
organization is genetic, but that reorganization comes as a result of experience during a sensitive 
period of interconnections. 
 
The transactional model considers multiple pathways in which environmental input affects brain 
organization. It includes the notion that, given a wide range of "nontoxic" environments, there 
are certain genetically programmed changes in brain organization that will occur. This unfolding 
of the genetic plan of neural development is what Greenough has written about as experience-
expectant changes (Black & Greenough, 1986; Greenough & Black, 1992; Greenough, Black, & 
Wallace, 1987). For example, the development of the visual system involves the interaction of 
genetically programmed neural changes in visual cortex with a certain amount of visual 
stimulation. These genetically programmed changes "expect" a certain level of visual 
stimulation. Given this stimulation, neural organization of this system occurs across species in a 
highly deterministic manner. Obviously, in the absence of expected environmental input, these 
changes will not occur, but given the range of "normal" environments they are expected to 
happen across individuals. Neural plasticity occurs across environments that vary significantly in 
the degree of stimulus input that the organism receives. If animals are denied visual input during 
the period of experience-expectant growth, will growth occur after this period, and will function 
be similar to that which would have appeared had visual input not been denied? 
 
Greenough (Greenough et al., 1987) interpreted the sensory deprivation literature as indicating 
that the complexity of the visual cortex is reduced in animals deprived of vision during the 
sensitive period of visual cortex development. Effects of visual deprivation can he reversed if the 
lack of stimulation is not prolonged. In cases of prolonged deprivation, however, morphological 
differences have been reported to persist in adult animals. 
 
Research Evidence for the Transactional Model 
We have adopted the transactional model for our research on cognitive and socioemotional 
functioning during infancy. Our work is based on the two suppositions of this model. First, there 
are genetically coded programs for the formation of brain structures and for the connections 
among these structures. Second, environmental influence may be able to modify these prepro-
grammed genetic codes. Evidence from our cognitive and socioemotional research studies lend 
support to the notion of plasticity during infancy. 
 
Neural plasticity and cognition 
The transactional model is useful in describing the role of experience in the development of 
neural structures associated with certain developmental milestones. We (Bell & Fox, 1994b) 
examined the effects of a naturally occurring environmental event on neural development in 
infants during the second half of the 1st year of life. Infant performance on the classic Stage 4 
object permanence task, Piaget's A-not-B, was observed and measured as a function of their self-
produced locomotion. Three lines of evidence spurred our interest in attempting to link the onset 
and length of experience infants have had with locomotion to neural development and to A-not-B 
performance. First, there are a number of studies in the developmental literature that suggest that 
hands-and-knees crawling may be related to object permanence performance. It has been 
reported that infants who successfully recover the hidden object from Side B during the A-not-B 
task have longer locomotor experience than unsuccessful infants (Horobin & Acredolo, 1986). 
And infants with 9 or more weeks of locomotor experience have been reported to perform at 
higher levels than either prelocomotor infants or infants with less than 4 weeks of crawling ex-
perience (Kermoian & Campos, 1988). 
 
Second, Diamond et al. (1990, 1991; Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1983, 1986, 1989; Diamond, 
Zola-Morgan, & Squire, 1989) have proposed that the maturation or integrity of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex is essential to successful search performance on the A-not-B task with delay. 
Thus, if early onset of hands-and-knees crawling affected the onset and performance success on 
the A-not-B task, it may also affect development of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex or the 
connections between this area and other brain regions. 
 
Third, the onset and length of time for naturally occurring, expected events such as locomotion 
should have a specific role on the development of neural connections. Greenough (Black & 
Greenough, 1986; Greenough & Black, 1992; Greenough et al., 1987) has proposed a model for 
the role of experience on the structure and function of the developing brain and on the further 
refinement of brain structure after maturation. Greenough's model predicts that the experience-
expectant event of crawling will result in modifications in brain structure. Immediately prior to 
the onset of crawling, the brain should begin overproducing synapses in expectation of the event. 
Thus, the brain of an infant primed for crawling should be structurally different than the brain of 
an infant some time away from this developmental milestone. Likewise, the brain of a novice 
crawler should still be retaining extra synapses as this new skill is honed. With increasing 
experience from locomotion, these extra synapses will be pruned, so that the brain of the 
experienced crawler should have fewer synaptic connections associated with crawling than the 
brain of the novice crawler. 
 
We therefore hypothesized relations among A-not-B performance, frontal lobe maturation 
(measured noninvasively via EEG), and locomotor experience. Specifically, we proposed that 
experience would affect performance on the A-not-B task and that frontal EEG recordings would 
differentiate between the infants with successful search skills and infants who were not suc-
cessful. Successful infants would display greater power over the dorsolateral frontal cortex, and 
there would be changes in neural connectivity as a function of locomotor onset and duration of 
crawling. 
 
Nunez (1981) has speculated that EEG power reflects the organization and excitability of a 
particular group of neurons. Across age, increases in EEG power have been proposed to reflect 
brain maturation (e.g., Bell & Fox, 1994a). Nunez (1981) further suggested that EEG coherence, 
the absolute value of the cross-correlation function between two electrode sites, reflects the level 
of axonal connectivity between two EEG recording sites. Thatcher (Thatcher et al., 1987) 
reported that periods of change in coherence between scalp locations during infancy and 
childhood are related to commonly accepted ages of major cognitive change during childhood. 
Thus, EEG power and coherence appear to be the most appropriate noninvasive electrocortical 
measures to use when investigating maturational change. 
 
Eighty 8-month-old infants were recruited as the subjects for this study and were selected on the 
basis of the amount of experience with hands-and-knees crawling. One group of infants had 1-4 
weeks of experience (n = 20), one group 5-8 weeks (n = 20), and one group 9 or more weeks (n = 
20). The fourth group was prelocomotor (n = 20). For each infant, the EEG was recorded from 
frontal, parietal, and occipital scalp sites, using techniques described in previous papers (e.g., 
Bell & Fox, 1992, 1994b). After EEG recordings, performance on Piaget's A-not-B task was as-
sessed. 
 
Consistent with the work of Kermoian and Campos (1988) and Horobin and Acredolo (1986), 
the four locomotor groups performed differentially on the object permanence task, F(3, 75) = 
8.74, p < .001. The three groups of crawling infants had similar performances on the task, while 
the prelocomotor infants performed less well (by Newman-Keuls). Specifically, 35% of the 
prelocomotor infants showed successful performance on the task, while 85% of the infants with 
1-4 weeks of crawling experience, 60% of the infants with 5-8 weeks of experience, and 80% 
with 9 or more weeks of experience were successful in retrieving the hidden object. Thus, even 
limited crawling experience enhanced performance on the task. In addition, we found that infants 
who were successful on the A-not-B task displayed greater EEG power compared to those who 
were unable to do the task. 
 
In confirmation of Greenough's model, we found differences among the locomotor groups on 
measures of EEG coherence. Infants with 1-4 weeks of crawling experience displayed greater 
overall coherence than either prelocomotor infants or long-term crawlers (see Figure 1). This 
suggests that the onset of crawling was associated with changes in cortical organization. At the 
onset of locomotion, there was an overproduction of cortico-cortical connections between 
frontal/occipital and parietal/ occipital sites. With increased locomotor experience, there was 
pruning of these connections. As seen in Figure 1, the particular pattern of pruning depended on 
the specific cortical connections. Frontal/occipital connections (see Figure 1, top) showed a sharp 
increase with locomotion and a gradual decline. Parietal/occipital connections (see Figure 1, 
bottom) also showed a sharp increase but also an earlier decline. These differential changes in 
EEG coherence may reflect changes in axonal connection. The pattern may be specific to the 
type of developmental change we investigate. The parietal lobes are intimately related to spatial 
skills (Andersen, 1988). Their interconnection with other regions may be critical for the rapid 
onset of crawling. As crawling became more automatic and length of time of crawling increased, 
the overabundance of the connections was no longer necessary. 
 
 
We have used the transactional model to investigate normal cognitive development. This type of 
research also has ramifications concerning abnormal cognitive development. Two examples 
highlight this notion. First, neuroscientists using a classic enrichment paradigm have reported 
that brain structure and chemistry of rats were altered by experience (e.g., Greenough & 
Volkmar, 1973; Rosenzweig et al., 1972). Environmentally, the rats were raised in either com-
plex (i.e., enriched) environments or impoverished cages. Rats raised in impoverished conditions 
took longer to adapt to the testing situation and performed poorly on learning tasks (e.g., 
Bennett, Rosenzweig, & Diamond, 1970; A. Diamond, 1990, 1991). Morphologically, rats raised 
in enriched environments displayed an increase in brain weight and in cortical thickness (Bennett 
et al., 1970; A. Diamond, 1990, 1991). Similarly, there was a difference in the number of 
synaptic connections between rats raised in enriched environments and those raised in 
impoverished ones (Greenough et al., 1987). 
 
Parallels can be drawn to work with human infants raised in impoverished environments. 
Cultural-familial retardation, mental retardation not caused by genetic disorder or brain damage 
(Santrock, 1992), may have its roots in the exposure to less enriched environments (Landesman 
& Ramey, 1989). For infants at risk for cognitive delay, early intervention by means of edu-
cational programs during the first 3 years of life appeared to decrease the incidence of 
developmental delay or mild mental retardation compared to control infants (Ramey & Ramey, 
1992; Wasik, Ramey, Bryant, & Sparling, 1990). Based on findings from the neuroscience 
research, one might speculate that the cortical development of at-risk control group would be 
different from those at-risk infants who received the early intervention. Electrocortical measures 
of brain development could support these speculations. 
 
The second example of how use of the transactional model has ramifications for abnormal 
cognition involves recent research on infants and young children with PKU, a genetic disorder 
causing an elevated Phe amino acid level in the blood. PKU causes mental retardation if not 
treated with dietary restrictions soon after birth. Diamond and colleagues (Diamond et al., 1994) 
and Welsh and Pennington and colleagues (Welsh, Pennington, Ozonoff, Rouse, & McCabe, 
1990) have reported that infants and preschoolers with early-treated PKU were impaired on age-
appropriate frontal lobe tasks compared to matched controls. In each study, children with early-
treated PKU had IQs that fell within the normal range. Diamond noted that, within the same 
child, deficits in frontal functioning covaried inversely with blood plasma Phe levels over time 
and that frontal deficits may be reversible through the 1st year of life (Diamond et al., 1994). 
Specifically, infants with high Phe levels before 9 months of age showed impairment in frontal 
tasks. Four of these infants displayed normal Phe levels by 10 months of age, and by 12 months 
of age performance on frontal lobe tasks for these same infants was normal. This report from 
Diamond is an excellent example of the use of the transactional model to examine abnormal 
development. It describes how the environment (dietary control) can alter a genetically prepro-
grammed code for abnormal brain development (PKU), and how further environmental input 
(decreasing Phe levels in the plasma) can subsequently enhance frontal functioning. 
 
Neural plasticity and temperament 
The role of neuroplasticity in infant temperament may be usefully examined with a transactional 
approach. There are data that suggest that certain patterns of behavior identifiable in the 1st year 
of life may be related to specific temperamental types of children. Kagan and colleagues have 
argued that infants displaying high degrees of motor activity and distress in response to novelty 
are likely to be inhibited as toddlers and young children. We have focused our efforts on the 
study of the neural correlates of this behavior/temperament pattern. In doing so, we hoped to 
answer a number of questions directly related to the issue of neural plasticity and environmental 
influence on infant temperament. The first question was whether we could identify a specific 
physiological response or measure that could serve as a marker for the early manifestations of 
behavioral inhibition. The second question of interest was whether this physiological measure 
remained stable over time and adequately predicted inhibited behavior. And the third question 
was whether or not change in the phenotypic display of behavior (change from inhibited 
behavior to less extreme response for example) was accompanied by a change in the physiologi-
cal marker of the response. The latter question is most relevant to issues of neural plasticity. For 
if, as behavior changes, patterns of neural activity change in the same direction, this might be 
evidence for the flexibility of the neural system as a function of environmental input. 
 
 
These research questions, in addition, might have important meaning for the study of the 
interface of biology and developmental psychopathology. There are data that indicate that young 
children who are inhibited may be at risk for particular behavior problems during the preschool 
and school period. For example, Rubin and colleagues (Rubin, Hymel, Mills, & RoseKrasnor, 
1991; Rubin, Stewart, & Coplan, in press) have reported that socially withdrawn children are 
more often rejected by their peers, form fewer friendships, are less socially competent, and are 
more likely as they grow older to display signs of depression and anxiety. Thus, the study of the 
biological factors may be critical for early identification of certain temperament types of children 
who are at risk for particular kinds of behavior disorders. 
 
Can we identify a specific physiological response that might serve as a marker for the early 
manifestations of inhibited behavior? To study this question, we drew on the work of Kagan and 
colleagues (Kagan & Snidman, 1991) and our own research with an unselected random sample 
of infants (Calkins & Fox, 1992) in order to identify specific behaviors in early infancy that 
might be predictive of later fearful and anxious behavior in children. In previous studies (Calkins 
& Fox, 1992), we reported that infants who responded with negative affect and distress to a 
series of novel elicitors were more likely to display fear and anxiety as toddlers. Kagan and 
colleagues (Kagan & Snidman, 1991) developed a battery of tasks, including presentation of 
novel auditory and visual events, which they utilized to screen a large sample of children to 
select infants who they felt would display behavioral inhibition as toddlers. Kagan identified two 
dimensions as relevant for identifying these infants: frequency of motor activity and degree of 
negative affect. Infants in their study who displayed a high frequency of motor activity and 
negative affect in response to novel stimuli were more likely to display behavioral inhibition at 
14 months of age. 
 
We adopted this screening procedure, adding the dimension of positive affect behaviors to our 
coding. We screened 200 children in their homes presenting them with a series of novel auditory 
and visual stimuli. Their behaviors were videotaped and subsequently coded for frequency of 
motor activity and expression of positive and negative affect. Three groups of infants were se-
lected. The first group consisted of infants who displayed high amounts of both motor activity 
and negative affect and low amounts of positive affect (n = 30). This group of infants is similar, 
then, to the group of infants Kagan found to be behaviorally inhibited at 9 and 14 months of age 
(Kagan & Snidman, 1991). The second group of infants we were able to identify displayed high 
amounts of motor activity and positive affect and low amounts of negative affect (n = 19). The 
third group of infants displayed low amounts of motor activity and low amounts of positive and 
negative affect (n = 32). 
 
These three groups of infants were assessed during follow-up visits to the laboratory at 9, 14, and 
24 months of age. At 9 months of age, infants came to the laboratory at which time the EEG was 
recorded. At 14 months of age, infants and mothers were observed in a procedure designed to 
elicit inhibited versus uninhibited behavior, and the EEG was again recorded. At 24 months of 
age, infants and mothers were observed in a series of procedures designed to elicit inhibition, 
compliance, frustration tolerance, and impulsivity, and, again, the EEG was recorded. EEG data 
were available for 66 of the 81 subjects seen at 9 months of age and for 61 of 71 subjects seen at 
24 months of age. Artifact-free data were available on less than 50 of the 14-monthold subjects. 
Data loss at this age was likely due to the fact that these children, having recently attained 
upright mobility, were difficult to keep still during the procedure. 
 
At 14 months of age, 67 infants (30 males and 37 females) were observed in a playroom for three 
brief episodes: (a) novel room (5 min of free play with mother in playroom); (b) novel person 
(stranger enters playroom and presents truck while keeping head down for 1 min, stranger plays 
with truck for 1 min, stranger invites child to play for 1 min); and (c) novel object (stranger 
presents electronic robot for 2 min). The primary measure of interest to us from these laboratory 
procedures was an index of inhibited behavior. Inhibition was scored using procedures similar to 
those used by Calkins and Fox (1992) and by Kagan and colleagues (Kagan et al., 1987; Rez-
nick, Gibbons, Johnson, & McDonough, 1989). A single summary index of inhibition was 
computed using the sum of standardized scores representing latency to touch the first toy, latency 
to vocalize, and time spent in proximity to the mother during free play; latency to vocalize to and 
approach the stranger and robot, and time spent in proximity to mother during the stranger, truck, 
and robot sequences; and frequencies of displays of negative affect during all episodes. 
 
At 24 months of age, 71 infants and mothers returned to the laboratory and were observed during 
several brief episodes designed to elicit the child's ability to cope with novelty, frustration, 
impulsivity, and compliance. To assess the child's response to novelty, the child was observed in 
the following episodes: (a) novel room (5 min of free play with mother in playroom); (b) novel 
person (stranger enters playroom and presents truck while keeping head down for 1 min, stranger 
plays with truck for 1 min, stranger invites child to play for 1 min); (c) novel object (stranger 
presents electronic robot for 2 min); (d) tunnel (stranger presents play tunnel and invites child to 
enter for 2 min); and (e) clown (research assistant dressed as clown enters room, stands si lently 
for 30 s, and then invites child to play for 1 min). To assess compliance, the experimenter 
entered the room after an initial 5-min free play and asked the child to clean up the toys. Mothers 
were instructed to handle the situation as they would at home and were free to assist the child in 
cleaning up. The child was given 5 min to clean up the toys. To assess impulsivity, the child was 
seated at a small table, with a box of crayons and several sheets of paper placed in front of him 
or her. The experimenter told the child not to touch the crayons until he or she had returned to 
the room. The child waited for up to 2 min. To assess frustration tolerance, the child was given a 
closed plastic container that contained an attractive toy. The child was asked to open the con-
tainer to retrieve the toy and was given 2 min to do so. 
 
From these episodes, several behavioral summary scores were computed. A single summary 
index of inhibition was computed using the sum of standardized scores representing latency to 
touch the first toy, latency to vocalize, and time spent in proximity to the mother during free 
play; latency to vocalize to and approach the stranger, robot, clown, and tunnel, and time spent in 
proximity to the mother during the stranger, robot, tunnel, and clown sequences; and frequencies 
of displays of negative affect during el episodes. A single summary index of compliance was 
computed by using the standardized summary score representing the amount of time it took the 
child to clean up, the number of refusals of maternal requests, and a negative affect score. 
Impulsivity was scored as the standardized summary score of latency to touch the crayons and 
latency to color with the crayons. Frustration tolerance was scored as the standardized summary 
score of the amount of time the child spent opening the container minus the number of refusals to 
open the container and a rating of affect. 
 
Is EEG asymmetry related to early infant temperament? The EEG asymmetry score is a measure 
applied when examining differences in hemispheric functioning within an individual subject. 
Asymmetry scores (right power-left power) are computed for each region, and this difference 
score is used to express the magnitude and direction of asymmetry. A positive number reflects 
left hemisphere activation, while a negative number reflects right hemisphere activation. Our 
previous work has shown that right frontal asymmetry is associated with negative reactivity to 
maternal separation and to novelty (e.g., Calkins et al., in press; Fox, Bell, & Jones, 1992). (As 
we have demonstrated in this paper and elsewhere, the EEG asymmetry score is a measure of un-
derlying brain organization that may be predictive of later temperament. Unlike the EEG power 
and coherence measures, which fluctuate with age, EEG asymmetry scores are not reflective of 
maturation. Rather, we propose that EEG asymmetry reflects an inborn temperamental 
disposition.) 
 
To answer this question, we examined differences in EEG activity as a function of 
temperamental group (Calkins et al., in press). We found that infants who were high motor/high 
negative at 4 months of age exhibited a pattern of right frontal EEG asymmetry at 9 months of 
age and were inhibited at 14 months of age. Infants who were high motor/high positive at 4 
months of age were showing a pattern of left frontal EEG asymmetry at 9 months of age and 
were uninhibited at 14 months of age. Thus, there seemed to be a significant relation between the 
infant's temperament and the pattern of frontal brain electrical activity. 
 
Is the EEG pattern stable over time, and what are the implications of stability for temperamental 
behaviors? To answer these questions, we created three groups of infants based on the pattern of 
their frontal EEG activity across the 15-month period of the study. One group of infants whose 
pattern of EEG was characterized by greater right frontal activation at both 9 and 24 months of 
age was placed together: These represented the stable right group. A second group of infants who 
displayed left frontal asymmetry at both ages were grouped together: These represented the 
stable left group. A third group of infants whose EEG asymmetry changed from left to right or 
from right to left over the 15-month period comprised the change group. 
 
Analysis of variance and post-hoc analyses indicated that the stable right group differed 
significantly from the stable left group in right hemisphere power at 9 months of age (F(2, 40) = 
'7.28, p = .002, Newman-Keuls, p = .05), and the stable right group differed significantly from 
the stable left group in both right and left hemisphere power at 24 months of age (F(2, 40) = 
11.08, p = .001, Newman-Keuls, p = .05). That is, stable right infants were more right activated 
in the frontal scalp region across the 15-month period compared to the other groups of infants. 
The stable right infants were also more likely to have been selected at 4 months of age as high 
motor/ high negative affect infants. A chi-square analysis comparing the 4-month temperament 
groups and the EEG stability groups indicated a significant relation between these two groups, 
X
2
 = 9.87, p = .04. Of the 11 infants classified as stable right, 7 were in the high motor/high 
negative group. 
 
We next investigated the relation between the stability of EEG and behavior at 14 and then at 24 
months of age. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing the three EEG asymmetry groups 
on the index of inhibition at 14 months of age indicated a significant group difference. A priori 
planned comparisons of the stable right and stable left groups indicated that the stable right 
group was significantly more inhibited at 14 months of age than the stable left group, t(32) = 
2.15, p = .04. ANOVAs comparing the three asymmetry groups on several 24-month behaviors 
indicated a number of significant group differences. A priori comparisons of the stable right and 
stable left groups revealed that the stable right group was more compliant (t(40) = 1.98, p = .05), 
less impulsive (t(40) = - 2.01, p = .05), and more tolerant of frustration (t(39) = 2.12, p = .04) 
than the stable left group (see Figure 2). 
 
Finally, an ANOVA examining 24-month inhibition as a function of EEG asymmetry group and 
inhibition at 14 
 
months of age revealed a significant main effect for 14-month inhibition (F(1, 30) = 10.92, p = 
.002). In addition a significant interaction between inhibition at 14 months of age and EEG group 
was found (F(1, 30) = 3.99, p = .05). The interaction indicates that infants who had been stable 
right in their pattern of EEG asymmetry and who had been inhibited at 14 months of age were 
more inhibited than those infants who had been stable right but had not been inhibited at 14 
months of age. None of the stable left infants were inhibited at 14 months of age. These findings 
indicate that there may be a small group of infants who exhibit a stable pattern of right frontal 
EEG asymmetry across the infant and toddler age period and that this pattern of asymmetry may 
be predictive of later temperament and social behavior. 
 
Does the EEG pattern change when behavior changes? To examine whether or not a change in 
behavior across the 24-month age period would be reflected in a change in EEG pattern, several 
exploratory analyses were conducted. First, we examined infants selected at 4 months of age for 
high motor/ 
 
high negative affect in terms of their 24-month behavior and their 24-month EEG asymmetry. 
We were interested to see how many of this temperamental type were still inhibited in their 
response to novelty and still displayed a pattern of right frontal asymmetry. As Figure 3 
indicates, at 24 months of age, infants who had been selected at 4 months of age as high motor/ 
high negative still displayed right frontal EEG activation, F(2, 57) = 4.37, p = .02. However, 
some of the infants no longer tended to be inhibited. Even though a number of high motor/high 
negative infants did not display behavioral inhibition at 24 months of age, they continued to ex-
hibit greater relative right frontal activation. 
 
In a second exploratory analysis, we compared those infants who were selected at 4 months of 
age for high motor/high negative affect and who also displayed right frontal EEG asymmetry at 9 
months of age to those infants selected at 4 months of age for the opposite temperamental pattern 
(high motor/high positive affect) who also displayed left frontal EEG asymmetry at 9 months of 
age. These two groups of infants displayed, then, both the behavioral and physiological profile 
thought to be predictive of inhibited behavior. These two groups of infants differed significantly 
in terms of inhibited behavior at 14 months of age, t(14) = 2.27, p = .04. As Figure 4 indicates, 
infants displaying the negative temperament and EEG right frontal pattern were more likely to be 
inhibited at 14 months of age compared to those displaying the positive temperament and EEG 
left pattern. However, by 24 months of age, a number of the negative temperament and EEG 
right infants had changed their behavior and were no longer inhibited. All but one of the positive 
temperament and EEG left infants retained their uninhibited style of behavior. An examination of 
behavior and EEG at 24 months of age indicated that, despite the fact that several of the negative 
temperament and EEG right infants were no longer inhibited at 24 months of age, they retained 
the physiological profile of right frontal asymmetry. Among the infants whose behavioral pattern 
changed from inhibited at 14 months of age to no longer inhibited at 24 months of age, only one 
child displayed a change in EEG pattern (from right frontal asymmetry to left frontal 
asymmetry). These findings indicate that the early behavioral and physiological profile of 
negative reactivity and right frontal 
 
EEG asymmetry is a strong predictor of inhibited behavior at 14 months of age. And, although 
some infants may show a change in this behavioral pattern from 14 to 24 months of age, this 
behavioral change does not appear to be accompanied by a change in the underlying physiology. 
 
In answering the questions regarding the behavioral outcomes that may be related to 
physiological stability and the physiological changes that may accompany behavioral changes, 
several conclusions may be drawn. First, our assumption that physiology seems to drive behavior 
appears to have support in the data from our selected longitudinal sample. The physiological 
profiles of stable right frontal asymmetry and stable left frontal asymmetry were strongly related 
to a number of behavioral outcomes at 14 and 24 months of age. Second, although we have 
clearly observed behavioral change among our selected sample of infants, this change is not 
reflected in a change in the underlying physiology of the infant. Infants who, in the 1st year of 
life, displayed a behavioral pattern of negative reactivity and a physiological pattern of right 
frontal EEG asymmetry, did show some behavioral change by the 2nd year of life. This behav-
ioral change, however, was not reflected in their pattern of EEG. 
 
Our assumption regarding the behavioral display of inhibition is that it represents the child's 
attempt to cope with high levels of arousal. Children who are particularly aroused by novelty and 
stress may develop regulatory mechanisms that remove them from threatening situations but that 
may, over time, involve internalizing their anxiety, stifling their impulsivity, and, in general, 
making them timid and compliant. Moreover, one interpretation regarding behavioral change is 
that some infants have learned to regulate their reactivity to novelty such that they no longer 
appear as inhibited as they once did. They may still experience a high degree of arousal to 
novelty, but through interactions with parents, for example, they may have learned to cope with 
that arousal so that they are able to control their display of negative affect in novel situations. 
 
We have discussed elsewhere what we believe are the critical connections between patterns of 
brain asymmetry and affect regulation and between affect regulation and developing social 
behavior (Calkins, 1994; Fox, 1994). And we have speculated on the role that a particular 
constellation of physiological/behavioral phenomena may play in the development of patterns of 
behavior that may place the child at risk for interpersonal problems. For example, we have sug-
gested that fearful, inhibited infants may develop a particular behavioral pattern that reflects 
inadequate regulation of affective arousal: They rarely exhibit autonomous behavior, they fail to 
approach novelty, and they lack exploratory skills. Using data from a previous longitudinal study 
with unselected infants, we found that these inhibited children, when faced with interactions with 
unfamiliar peers were reticent, withdrawn, and anxious. These children were also rated by their 
mothers as being shy and they scored higher on the internalizing scale of the Child Behavior 
Checklist than their uninhibited counterparts (Calkins, Fox, Rubin, & Coplan, 1994). These 
findings suggest that negotiating interactions with peers may be difficult for inhibited children, 
because they are unable to begin that interaction with the necessary approach behaviors: The 
strategy they have chosen to help them cope with the arousal evoked by novelty has precluded 
them from acquiring skills necessary to initiate social interaction. The result is that these children 
tend to exist on the periphery of activity and become isolated from the play of their peers. 
 
The data that we have collected over the last several years, from both selected and unselected 
longitudinal samples of children, highlight the utility of an emotion regulation framework for 
interpreting both behavioral and physiological data. Our physiological data suggest links 
between hemispheric activation and emotional arousal and, in particular, emphasize the role that 
hemispheric asymmetry may play in approach versus withdrawal tendencies that are observed on 
a behavioral level as the child attempts to cope with emotional arousal. Our behavioral data 
suggest that it is important to recognize that long-term consequences of nonadaptive or 
dysregulating coping strategies may, over time, develop into internalizing or externalizing dis-
orders. For example, what may initially appear to be an effective strategy for coping with novelty 
(such as withdrawal and retreat to security) may become a more problematic pattern if it is 
maintained into childhood. The early strategy may establish a pattern of social withdrawal that, 
while perhaps not a severe behavior problem of itself, may become so if the child's missed op-
portunities for peer interaction result in depression and low self-esteem. The dysregulation that 
caused the child to withdraw from social novelty may not of itself have been psychopathological 
in nature, but its consequences could nevertheless enhance the risk of developing internalizing 
disorders at a later point in childhood or adolescence (Rubin et al., in press). Indeed, the question 
of long-term implications of this tendency to be inhibited has recently been explored from the 
perspective of developmental psychopathology (Hirshfeld et al., 1992). This follow-up of 
children studied from infancy to age 7 found that, among children who had consistently 
displayed inhibition across the 7-year span, there were significantly higher rates of anxiety 
disorder than among a group of children who were consistently uninhibited. 
 
Although the observations we have made regarding physiological stability and its relation to 
behavioral change seem to argue against a transactional approach, we remain somewhat cautious 
regarding their conclusions. First, the number of subjects who change behavior over the brief 
period of study is small. The general pattern we have observed in our data is, at least among the 
most extreme children, one of behavioral and physiological stability. Second, we have only 
followed these infants through 2 years of age. It is possible that as social behavior becomes more 
complex and inhibitory systems mature there will be a change in the organization of brain 
activity that will follow that found for behavior. Future longitudinal work will hopefully allow us 
to answer these issues. 
 
Conclusions 
The issues of neural plasticity are critical to our understanding of the relation between biology 
and experience in the development of complex behavior patterns. In this paper, we have 
presented evidence from two different domains on the role of maturation and experience in 
developing brain organization. From our work with normal infants and children, we have shown 
how our use of the transactional model of brain plasticity has implications for abnormal 
cognitive development and emotional regulation. 
 
Our work has demonstrated the utility of the ongoing EEG as a means of assessing neural 
organization in the awake, intact, alert infant and young child. Using measures of EEG power 
and coherence, we have illustrated how different rates of maturation of an expected locomotor 
event affect neural organization and cognitive performance at a specific point in time. We found 
EEG coherence differences among 8month-old infants with varying amounts of crawling 
experience and speculated that changes in axonal connections between brain regions are 
modified with this kind of environmental input. We also reported that the infants who were 
locomotor performed at a higher level on the A-not-B task than prelocomotor infants and that 
infants exhibiting successful A-not-B performance also displayed greater EEG power values at 
frontal, but not other, recording sites. These performance data, along with the coherence and 
power data, point to an interaction among experience, brain development, and object permanence 
performance in normal infant cognition. We noted that the association between environment and 
brain development also has ramifications concerning abnormal cognitive development and cited 
recent work on environmental influences on cognitive performance in support of this idea. 
 
We have also used EEG to explore the relations between physiology and temperament and have 
applied a model of the relation between innate dispositions that have at their core a particular 
pattern of brain asymmetry and the development of particular styles of emotion regulation. In 
investigating this model, we have found (a) that there is a pattern of right frontal EEG 
asymmetry that maps onto an early predisposition to be irritable; (b) that for some infants, this 
predisposition is highly stable and predictive of fear and anxiety in early childhood; and (c) that 
there is a tendency for the underlying biological predisposition to remain, even when the 
behavior itself does not. Moreover, we have used this model of the relations between EEG 
asymmetry and temperament to speculate on the development of more extreme forms of child 
behavior that may in fact fall within the realm of developmental psychopathology. 
 
Through use of the transactional model of brain development, we investigate the crucial 
interaction between environmental input and neural plasticity during infancy. Each of the EEG 
methods we use to assess brain activity (i.e., power, coherence, and asymmetry) provide different 
aspects to the complex picture of the role of the environment on neural organization. The 
ultimate end product, normal or abnormal brain development and behavior, depends on this 
intricate interaction. 
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